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Horst  Schulmann  -
Common  Economic  Policy  Challen9es  A  EuroGean  View  1)  ~ 
~ee  face 
1.  Rather  than  focus  on  the  short-term  outlook 
for  the  European  economy,  which  is  not  too 
bright  but  not  that  bad  either,  I would  like 
to  s~are with  you  some  of  my  views  on  the 
challenges  t~at economic  rolicy makers  are 
faced  with  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  at 
the  be~lnninp of  the  80s.  The  decade  behind 
us  has  not  exactly  been  an  eASY  one.  The 
ortimism  that  rrevailed  in  the  60s  is  lono  oone, 
and  many  reorle  believe  that  the  roino  nay 
become  even  rou~her in  the  80s.  Certainly 
there  is  no  reason  for  complacency, 
2.  The  challenpes  are  well  known.  Let  me  mention 
the  follm'finQ  six: 
(a)  we  have  to  tackle  the  twin  problem  of  in-
flation  and  unemPloyment; 
(b)  we  must  break  the  link  between  economic 
Qrowth  and  ener9V  consumption  ,  in  parti-
cular  we  must  reduce  our  dependence  on  oil; 
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(c)  we  must  make  some  nropress  towards  solvtnr 
the  most  urpent  problems  of  the  Third  ~orldJ 
I.e.  foodJ  enerQYJ  and  porulatlon  orcwth; 
{d)  we  have  to  strengthen  further  tre or.en  world 
tradinp  system  and  firmly  resist  r.ressures 
for  protectionist actions; 
(e)  we  must  encourape  investment  and  lnnovationJ 
so  as  to  Increase  productivitY  and  to  adapt 
our  economies  to  the  chanQes  takin9  place 
in  the  world  economy; 
(f)  we  must  continue  to  act  as  custodians  of  the 
international  monetary  systemJ  includinQ 
the  international  bankinp  system. 
-
3.  None  of  these  thallenges  is  exactly  new.  We 
inherited  them  from  the  70s.  MoreoverJ  there 
is  no  guarantee  that  economic  policy  makers 
will  not  be  faced  with  different  challenges 
in  the  decade  ahead.  IndeedJ  there  is  a 9reat 
likelihood  that  this will  be  the  case. 
In  a  si~ilar meeting  ten  years  aroJ  few  econo-
mists  would  have  predicted  the  break-
down  of  the  Bretton  Wodds  system  within  less 
than  36  months.  LikewlseJ  nobody  would  have 
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predicted  that  the  price  of  a barrel  of 
oil  would  go  up  from  2 dollars  to  over  30 
dollars  during  the  70s. 
But  the  challenges  I  have  listed are  those 
that  conventional  wisdom  can  perceive  of 
today,  As  we  know_,  they  are  all  interrelated. 
We  also  know  that  there  are  no  ouick  and 
painless  solutions  to  these  problems.  And 
finally  ~~e  know  that  we  will  not  be  able  to 
solve  these  problems  unless  we  act  in  a spirit 
of  international  cooperation  and  coordination. 
4.  I will  not  even  try  to  deal  in  a systematic 
fashion  with  all  the  challenges  which  I men-
tioned  earlier.  I wilL  instead)  deal  at 
some  length  with  those  three  issues  that 
dominated  the  discussions  of  our  leaders  in 
Venice  -- inflation_,  energy  and  our  relation-
ship  \~ i th  the  South  -- and  comment  on  the 
others  in  passing  or  in  the  discussion  which 
is  to  follow. - 4 -
5.  It  is  tempting  to  put  the  blame  for  all  of 
our  current  econOmic  ills on  OPECJ  in 
particular for  inflation.  CertainlyJ  the 
Quadrupling  of  oii  prices  after the  Yom 
Kippur  war  and  the  125  % increase  in  the  wake 
of  the  Iranian  revolution  have  had  a major  in-
flationary  impact.  The  average  OECD  inflation 
rate  in  1974/75  was  about  twice  as  hl~h as 
it was  in  1973.  And  in  1980  the  sta9e  seems 
to  be  set  for  a repeat  performance. 
But  unfortunately  the  matter  is  more  com-
Plicated;  inflation  rates  had  already  tended 
to  be  significantly  higher  at  the  beginninp  of 
the  70s  ~- before  the  collapse  of  the  Bretton 
Woods  system  and  before  the  first oil  price 
explosion.  There  is  a significant  ho~emade 
element  in  current  rates  of  inflation  as  wellJ 
most  notably  so  in  the  u.s.J  in  the  U.K.  and 
in  Italy,  I venture  that  these  are  also  the 
countries  in  which  inflationary expectations 
are  most  pronounced  todayJ  rllt no  countrYJ 
including  my  ownJ  is  immune  2gainst  a · 
certain degree  of  inflation mentalitY.  In  my  · 
viewJ  breakinp  these  inflationary expectations 
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is  the  first order  of  business  if we  want  to 
maintain  the  open  world  tradin9  and  monetary 
system  on  which  so  much  of  our  prosperitY  is 
based. 
6.  It has  been  said  that  inflation  is  simply  the 
reflection  of  what  has  been  called  the  increasin9 
ungovernabilitY  of  our  do~estic political  eco-
nomies.  While  there  are  also  other  factors  at 
work  it is  obvioDs  that  there  is  a stron9  incli-
nation  in  our  democratic  societies  to  resort  to 
the  printing  press  in  order  to  buy  social  peace  and 
to  satisfy expectations  that  are  not  matched 
by  productivitY  increases.  Such  policies  may 
buy  time  and  help  win  elections~ but  in  the 
long  run  they  are  bound  to  do  ~ore harm  than  good. 
7.  This  institutional  bias  is  aggravated  by  a 
professional  bias.  In  the  90od  old  60s  pro-
fessional  economists  became  increasingly  confi-
dent  of  their abilitY  to  finetune  the  economy. 
Accordingly~  it became  more  and  more  popular  to 
react  to  every  twist  and  turn  in  short-run  develop-
ments  rather  than  to  base  policy  changes  on  longer-
lasting features  and  necessities.  This  may  have  been 
beneficial  in  a period  when  world  GNP  and  trade 
grew  rapidly  and  when  the  prices  of  many  commodities~ 
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1ncludin9  oilJ  were  actually  declinin9. 
These  conditions  no  lon9er  exist.  Our  economies 
are  maturing,  The  70s  have  seen  dramatic  chan9es · 
in  relative  prices~ most  notablY  in  the  price  of 
oilJ  and  the  arrival  on  the  international  scene 
of  newly  industrializ1n9 countries.  Our  economies 
are  still  in  the  process  of  adjusting  to  these 
and  other  chan9es  in  the  world  economy,  This  will  be 
a time-consuminQ  process  which  protectionism  can 
only  delay  but  not  prevent.  There  will  therefore 
be  a premium  on  policies  that  foster  the  necessary 
adjustments.  By  their very  nature  these  will  be 
structural  policies  rather  than  countercyclical 
policies.  · 
g;  To  sum  up  this  part  of  my  statement:  the 
differences  in  domestic  inflation  rates  and~ 
more  generally  J  in  overall  performance~ which 
~'le  observe  today  have  a·  lot  to  do  with  the  firm-
ness  with  which  governments  and  parliaments  have 
resisted  the  temptation  to  please  potential  voters 
by  printing  money  that  is  not  matched  by  real 
resources  and  the  temptation  to  react  to  short-
run  economic  events  rather  than  to  long-term 
trends. 
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It  is  the  cumulative  effect  of  the  unresolved 
inflation  problem  in  imPortant  economies  and 
the  inflationary  pressures  resulting  from 
successive  oil  price  increases  that  accounts 
for  the  persistence  and  stren9th  of  world 
inflation. - 7  -
9.  Historical  experience  goes  a  long  way  to 
explain  the  differences  in  policy  responses. 
American  economic  policy  makers  are  haunted  by 
the  trauma  of  the  Great  Der.ression.  German 
policy  makers  are  haunted  by  the  trauma  of  the 
open  inflation  which  culminated  in  1923  and  of 
the  repressed  inflation  which  led  to  the  curren-
cy  reform  of  1948. 
American  economists  have  tended  to  take  a hi9hly 
elastic and  competitive  supply  of  goods  for 
granted  and  to  search  for  ways  how  to  create  the 
matching  demandJ  while  German  economists  have 
tended  to  focus  on  the  virtues of  stabilitY  and 
the  need  to  create conditions  conducive  to  higher 
productivitY  and  to  an  expansion  of  supply  rather 
than  demand. 
As  one  American  observerJ  who  has  spent  many 
years  in  BonnJ  puts  it very  aptlY:  "The  pattern 
of  German  thinking  introduces  into  German  policy 
what  Americans  regard  as  a bias  toward  deflatio-
nary  policies;  American  experience  and  American 
thinking  introduces  what  the  Germans  regard  as  a 
bias  toward  inflation." 
10.  Past  experience  may  also  be  at the  root  of 
different  policy  reactions  to  the  eneroy  crisis. 
Americans  and  Canadians  have  grown  up  with  the 
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presumption  that  the  supply  of  energy  is  vir-
tuallY  unlimited  and  that  energy  is  close  to 
being  a "free  good".  EuroneansJ  on  the  other 
hand)  were  brought  up  with  the  fi,rm  belief 
that  ener9y  is  a scarce  and  expensive  re-
source. 
The  Europeans  would  have  stuck  to  that  belief 
had  it not  been  for  the  decline  in  the  real 
price  of  oil  which  took  place  in  the  50s  and 
60s.  When  oil  became  increasinQlY  cheaoer  than 
coal)  they)  too)  switched  to  oil.  Neverthe-
less)  energy  consumption  rer  unit  of  GNP  in 
France)  Germany  and  Japan  is  still  only  half 
of  what  it is  in  the  u.s.  EC  oil  imports 
have  decreased  between  1973  and  1980  while 
those  of  the  U.s.  have  gone  uo  <  G~!P  grm'lth 
has  been  about  the  same  durin9  that  period). 
Pricing  policies  have)  of  course)  been  diffe-
rent.  Americans  and  Canadians  have  kept  the 
.. 
domestic  price  of  all  below  representative  world 
market  prices)  Europeans  have  not. 
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11.  In  retrospectJ  Europeans  wonder  whether  we 
might  not  have  been  collectively better off 
if the  real  price  of  oil  had  been  allowed  to 
rise  gradually  rather  than  in  a stepwise 
fashion  -- both  before  anct  after 1973.  If 
that  had  been  the  case  the  si9nals  to  con-
sumers  and  investors  would  have  been  clearer 
and  louder  and  their  reactions  to  the  impendinQ 
changes  in  relative prices  would  have  taken 
place  earlier, 
While  this  is  water  under  the  bridgeJ  I  be-
lieve  there  is a  lesson  to  be  drawn  for  the 
futureJ  particularly after the  disappearance 
of  Iran  as  a major  world  oil  supplier 
12.  We  must  realize  that  higher  oil  prices  are 
here  to  stayJ  and  that  the  real  price  of  oil 
is  likely to  go  even  higher  during  the  80s. 
It  is  not  in  our  own  interest to  lament 
about  this  and  to  emphasize  only  the  ne9ative 
repercussions  on  our  economies.  We  must  make 
a virtue  of  the  need  for  structural  chanpe  that 
goes  along  with  hipher  oil  rrices.  The  history 
of  mankind  is  a history  of structural chanpe.  ~~m'-1 
as  then  it will  offer  many  new  opportunities 
for  innovation  and  investment. 
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Structural  change  is  never  painless.  There 
will  be  losers  but  then  there  will  also  be 
many  winners.  First of  all  our  domestic  ener-
gy  producers.  But  also  all  companies  that 
supply  equipment  for  oil  conservation  and  oil 
substitution.  And  finallY  there  are  those 
producers  who  manage  to  gain  a share  of 
OPEC's  increasin9  ourchasin~ power. 
In  short)  we  must  seize  upon  these  opportuni-
ties -- and  not  look  back  in  anger. 
I  I  I ----------
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13.  The  oil  price  explosion  has  had  a devasta-
ting  impact  on  the  payments  balances  of  non-
oil  LDCs.  In  1980~  their oil  bill will  amount 
to  over  50  billion  dollars~  i.e.  twice  as  much 
as  the  official  develooment  assistance  pro-
vided  by  OECD  countries  (25  billion dollars). 
On  average  non-oil  LDCs  will  have  to  set 
aside  25  % of  their export  earnings  to  pay 
for  th~ir oil  imports~  some  however  substantial-
ly  more  (eg,  India:  33  %;  Brazil  40  %;  Turkey 
60  %).  ClearlY~  this  is  an  untenable  situation. 
14.  EightY  percent  of  commercial  enerpy  consumption 
in  LDCs  is accounted  for  by  oil  and  gas.  Per 
unit  of  output  LDC  ener9Y  consumption  is 
roughly  the  same  as  in  developed  countries. 
On  the  other  hand~  per  capita  ener9y  consumption 
is  only  a  fraction~  in  many  only  a tiny  one~  of 
that  in  our  countries.  Nevertheless~ these 
countries~  too~ will  have  to  reduce  their 
dependence  on  imported  oil  if they  want  to  ful-
fill  their growth  asptrations.  In  this. 
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process  full  cost  pr1c1nq  of  energy  will  have 
an  important  role  to  play;  no  countrY~ not 
even  the  poorest~  can  afford  the  luxury  of 
underpricing  scarce  resources.  This  may 
sound  harsh  but  it is  inevitable  if the  "ripht" 
demand  and  supply  reactions  are  to  come  forth. 
15.  Energy  has  a direct  bearing  on  the  food  problem. 
The  growth  of  agricultural  production  in  LDCs 
has  been  largely  due  to  hi9her  inputs  of  waterJ 
fertilizer and  pesticides.  It takes  energy  to 
provide  these  inputs;  it takes  energy  to  run 
the  tractors  and  trucks  which  are  needed 
to  feed  an  ever  growinQ  urban  population.  In 
short~  the  availabilitY  of  energy  is  a matter 
of  survival  for  many  LDCs. 
16.  What  can  be  done  about  this? 
There  is  uncertainty  about  the  LDC  potential 
for  energy  savings  but  whatever  potential  exists 
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should  be  exploited.  In  overall  terms  and  in 
the  longer  run  the  development  of  new  con-
ventional  and  alternative ener9Y  sources  will 
have  a greater  impactJ  however. ·CapitalJ  tech-
nology  and  technical  assistance will  be  needed 
to  he 1  Pr~non-o  i 1 LDCs  save  and  produce  more 
energy, 
This  will  take  time.  Meanwhile  non-oil  LDCs  are 
running  huger  payments  deficits  than  ever 
beforeJ  drivin~ them  into  ever  increasing  indeb-
tedness.  Official  development  assistance  from 
OECD  countries  which  used  to  be  a multiple 
of  the  LDC  all  import  bill  cannot  close  this  gap, 
OPEC  aid  14.6  billion dollars  in  1979)  is  heavi-
ly  concentrated  on  a number  of  Islamic  countries. 
COMECON  provides  less  than  1 billion dollars  a 
year. (The  Federal  Republic  alone  has  given 
eight  times  as  much  aid  in  1978  as  the  Soviet 
Union.)  So  far  the  private  international  banking 
system  has  been  able  to  fill  most  of  the  gap, 
But  more  and  more  bankers  seem  to  have  doubts 
about  the  wisdom  of  expanding  their  internatio-
nal  business  at  past  rates;  perceived  or  actual 
country  risks  have  increased  and  equitY/loan  ratios 
have  tended  to  deteriorate - always  compared 
to  the-situation  before  the  first oil  price  explo-
sion. 
I  0  I 
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Most  experts  expect  that  non-oil  LDCs  will  be 
able  to  muddle  throu9h  in  1980  and  probably 
also  in  1981.  But  the  problem  is  bound  to 
become  more  acute  as  time  goes  by, 
17.  The  international  financial  institutions~ 
in  particular  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank~ 
should  assume  a  larger  role~  both  in  miti9ating 
the  balance-of-payment  impact  of  the  second  oil 
price  explosion  and  in  financing  energy  investment 
ln  non-oil  LDCs.  They  will  only  be  able  to  do  so, 
however~  if we  make  available  to  them~ without 
further  delay~ the  funds  we  have  already  pledged; 
the  U.S.  Congress  has  a great  respons1blllty  in 
this  respect. 
18.  But  OPEC  and  COMECON  Will  also  have  to  step  up 
their efforts.  As  the  Venice  Summit  concluded: 
"The  democratic  industrialized countries  _ 
cannot  alone  carry  the  responsibilitY 
of  aid  and  other  different contributions 
to  developing  countries:  it must 
be  equitably  shared  by  the  oil  exporting 
countries  and  the  industrialized  Communist 
countries." 
The  oil  exporting  countries  which  have  caused 
the  deterioration  of  the  development  prospects 
in  the  Third  World  should  participate more  than 
in  the  past  in  the  direct  recycling  to 
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non-oil-LDCsJ  preferably  by  setting  up  a de 
facto  two-tier  price  system. 
19.  The  magnitude  of  these  problems  is  not  matched 
by  the  qualitiY  of  the  North-South  discussions. 
ThereforeJ  the  Brandt  Commission  has  proposed 
a summit  meeting  of  leaders  from  both  industria-
lized  and  developinQ  nations  to  break  the  dead-
lock  in  North-South  relations.  My  country  supports 
this  idea.  The  purpose  of  such  a meeting  would 
not  be  to  take  decisions  but  to  reach  a better 
mutual  understanding  of  the  Qlobal  problems  and 
to  provide  some  guidance  for  the  ne9ot1ators  in 
other  fora.  It  is  importantJ  howeverJ  that  such 
a summit  is  an  informal  one  and  that  the  number  of 
participahts  is  restricted. 
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20.  Let  me  end  on  a note  of  confidence. 
Time  and  aQain  our  democratic  societies 
have  demonstrated  their abilitY  to  feedJ 
clothe  and  shelter our  people  better than 
any  other  economic  system.  Indeed  they  have 
come  a  lon9  way  to  provide  the  material  basis 
for  what  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
calls the  pursuit  of  happiness.  I  am  fully 
convinced  that  we  will  continue  to  supersede. 
There  is  no  doubt  in  my  mind  that  weJ  collec-
tivelyJ  will  be  abl1e  to  meet  the  challen~es 
of  the  80sJ  provided  that  we  bear  the  lessons 
of  the  70s  in  mind  and  approach  the  80s  in  a 
spirit of  cooperation. 